COLIN L. POWELL, 10:30 A.M. EST, 2003.2.5
1. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President and Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for the special effort that each of you made to be here today. This is an important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
2. Last November 8th, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years.
3. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years.
4. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply.
5. And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job.
6. This Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.
7. I asked for this session today for two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27th, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it."
8. And as Dr. El Baradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7th "did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998."
9. My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions.
10. I might add at this point that we are providing all relevant information we can to the inspection teams for them to do their work.
11. The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other countries. Some are the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.
12. I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts and Iraqis' behavior, Iraq's behavior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international community.
13. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.
14. Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about to hear is a conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on November 26th of last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the Republican Guard. (The tape is played.)
15. Let me pause and review some of the key elements of this conversation that you just heard between these two officers.
16. First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohammed El Baradei is coming, and they know what he's coming for and they know he's coming the next day. He's coming to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things.
17. But they're worried. We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it? What is their concern? Their concern is that it's something they should not have, something that should not be seen.
18. The general was incredulous: (tape script)
"You didn't get it modified. You don't have one of those, do you?" "I have one." "Which? From where?" "From the workshop. From the Al-Kindi Company." "What?" "From Al-Kindi." "I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried you all have something left." "We evacuated everything. We don't have anything left."
19. Note what he says: "We evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up. "I will come to you tomorrow."
20. The Al-Kindi Company. This is a company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity.
12. 我无法向你们公布我们所掌握的全部情况，但是，一旦把我将能向你们介绍的情况与我们所有人多年来所已经了解的情况联系到一起，情况深深令人不安。你们所将看到的，是积累起来的大量事实和令人不安的行为模式。事实和伊拉克的行径表明，萨达姆·侯赛因及其政权丝毫没有 - 丝毫没有 - 按照国际社会的要求消除武器。